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Abstract
Some argue that political stability is best served through a two-party system. This study
refutes this. The author mathematically defines the stability and rigidity of electoral sys-
tems comprised of any quantity of electors and parties. In fact, stability is a function of
the quantity of electors - i.e., the number of occupied seats at the table. As the number of
electors increases, the properties of an electorate are increasingly well resolved, and well
described by those of an electorate that is least excessive – that is to say an electorate that
is closest to equilibrium. Further, electoral rigidity is a function of the quantity of parties
and their probabilities of representation. An absolutely rigid system admits no fluctuations
– whatever happens to one elector will happen to all electors. As the quantity of parties
increases so does the number of party lines, and with it the quantity of alternatives with
which to respond to an external stimulus. Rigidity is significant in a social system that
places high value on party loyalty. In conclusion, (i) electoral stability is best served by
increasing the quantity of electors; (ii) electoral rigidity is best served by decreasing the
quantity of parties, and by increasing the representation of some parties at the expense of
others; and (iii) the less stable a branch of government, the more concern is placed on those
who would hold those offices for the people.
Keywords: social-choice theory, competition theory, jury problem, political stability, polit-
ical rigidity
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1 Introduction
In Timmons versus Twin-Cities-Area New Party, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the con-
stitutionality of the “many barriers in the political arena[1].” The Twin-Cities-Area New Party
argued that its associational rights were violated by Minnesota electoral law. Writing for the
majority, Renquist thinks “the Constitution permits the Minnesota Legislature to decide that
political stability is best served through a healthy two-party system[1]1.” Though what the U.S.
Constitution permits or does not permit with regard to associational rights is outside the present
scope, the author draws on techniques well known in statistical mechanics to refute the thought
that premises Timmons. The author concludes that electoral stability and rigidity are best served
by increasing the quantity of electors and decreasing the quantity of parties, respectively.
Electoral science has a long tradition of combining ethics and reason to study how choice is
resolved. With respect to ethics, Black[2] recounts two conundra such that in a close election2
between people, motions, or parties, the election may be with an unjust resolution or without
any resolution. Specifically, Borda[3] describes that the party with the highest number of votes
may not be the most preferred party and Condorcet[4] describes a three-way draw. Though
several authors[3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11] prescribe rules to reduce these likelihoods, Arrow[12]
proves that it is impossible to preclude them. Ethics aside, Key[13] and Campbell[14] explain a
theory of critical elections whereby the electorate’s direction is flipped or rotated as compared
to antecedent elections, and moreover the re-orientation persists for one or more subsequent
elections. These latter two studies are of particular relevance to the present study because they
1The court’s majority opinion implies that the stability, S, is a function, f , of the quantity of parties, M (i.e.
S = f(M)). This manuscript clarifies that the stability is a function, g, only of the quantity of electors, N (i.e.
S = g(N) 6= f(M)); and that that the rigidity,R, is a function, h, of the quantity of parties, M (i.e. R = h(M)).
2The electoral theory herein holds for any election or selection so long as the vote or choice may be given
as an integer partion of N into M parts (see Section 3.4). Thus, the formalism here applies to most any vote
by any electoral body regardless of who the electors are (i.e., citizens, committees, juries, executives, judges,
legislators, etc.) or the subject matter(s) under consideration. Four relevant applications of this theory are discussed
in Section 5.
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employ directionality in a qualitative manner to describe the electorate, whereas herein the
author uses vectors, which include both magnitude and direction, to study the electorate in a
quantitative manner.
The problem addressed here is to understand how the stability and rigidity of an electoral
system vary with the quantity of electors, N , and parties, M . The philosophical approach
(Section 2) is to adhere to the law of parsimony by utilizing an isotropic preference structure.
The technical approach (Section 3) is to understand multi-party electoral systems by utilizing
multinomial properties and both magnitudal and directional ensemble averages. The results
(Section 4) are explained qualitatively by using two visual aids (Figures 2 and 3), and quanti-
tatively by writing closed-form analytic expressions for the stability (Equation 19) and rigidity
(Equation 20) of electoral systems. Results indicate that (i) beginning with absolute instabil-
ity for a single-elector system, the stability increases monotonically to unity as the quantity
of electors, N , increases; and (ii) beginning with absolute rigidity for a one-party system, the
rigidity decreases monotonically to null as the quantity of parties, M , increases. The discus-
sion (Section 5) focuses on asking and answering the following question: how does this theory
of electoral dynamics enhance the understanding of a real electoral systems. This discussion
makes use of the constitutional order of the United States of America as an archetype. Each
branch of government is analyzed individually and then they are analyzed together compara-
tively. Finally, the author draws three conclusions (Section 6): (1) electoral stability is best
served by increasing the quantity of electors; (2) electoral rigidity is best served by decreasing
the quantity of parties, and decreasing their proportional representation; and (3) the less stable
a branch of government, the more concern is placed on those who would hold those offices for
the people. There are two appendices. Each provides a necessary mathematical proof.
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2 Philosophical Approach
The author’s approach is grounded in the canon of philosophical thought. Throughout this study
of electoral dynamics the author adheres to Ockham’s law of parsimony: “explain[ing] by the
assumption of fewer things [15],” while adequately representing the most salient properties. As
a consequence, the author utilizes an isotropic preference structure – the underlying preference
is uniformly likely to be in any direction – and measures the properties of the entire ensemble
of permissible preference structures. A description of any one structure is foregone in favor of
a gross description of all structures simultaneously.
This approach is idealistic and realistic. Conventional wisdom dictates that “politics makes
strange bedfellows[16].” Thus, no matter how seemingly unlikely an electoral alliance may
appear, even the least preferable alliance may not be ignored or discounted. Further, we empir-
ically know that there are numerous ways for Party A and Party B to be oriented. At any given
time, Party A and Party B may be in agreement (parallel orientation) and be either in favor of
or against electoral issue i; they may be in disagreement and be in opposition (anti-parallel ori-
entation) on electoral issue j; either party may be in favor of or against electoral issue k while
the other party is ambivalent[17, 18] on the issue (perpendicular orientation); or, they may both
be ambivalent to electoral issue l, but for different reasons (co-planar orientation).
3 Technical Approach
The technical approach is to expand from an understanding of a binary system[19], whose states
are described with a binomial expansion, to an understanding of a multi-party system, whose
states are described by a multinomial expansion. The author begins by specifying the model
that is used to represent electoral systems (Section 3.1). The author continues by writing the
generating function, which yields the probability of each and every vote by an electorate (Sec-
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tion 3.2). Then, the author defines the primary vectors that will be used throughout this study;
chief among them are the electoral vector and the equilibrium-electoral vector (Section 3.3).
The author then briefly uses number theory to explain that each and every vote taken by an
electorate is a permutation of the partitions of a positive integer N into M (Section 3.4). The
author explains the relationship between the multiplicity of each vote configuration and the
probability-density function of a multinomially distributed variable (Section 3.5). Next, the au-
thor explains that a quantitative understanding of an electoral dynamics necessitates the use of
two ensemble averages: a magnitudal and a directional average (Section 3.6). The author then
uses vector algebra to define the fractional fluctuation, which a relative measure of the expected
deviation of a system from its equilibrium (Section 3.7). The author explains that the fractional
fluctuation is separable, and may be written as the product of the volatility, which is solely a
function of the quantity of electors, and the flexibility, which is solely a function of the quantity
of parties; and that the stability and rigidity are the unitary complements of the volatility and
flexibility, respectively (Section 3.8). Two assist the reader in comprehending this material, the
author provides an example electoral system in Figure 1, several examples of integer partitions
of N into M in Table 1, and a thorough example of how to calculate an ensemble average in
Table 2.
3.1 Specification of the Model
The author enumerates this theory with eleven statements, all of which are given below
a. There is a positive integer number, N , of seat of power in the system.
b. An elector occupies each and every seats of power.
c. There is a fixed integer M of possible outcomes.
d. The direction of the kth possible outcome points in the direction of unit vector kˆ.
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e. Each elector must align with one and only one outcome.
f. The event probabilities of the outcomes are p1, p2, . . . , pM ,
g. An elector aligned with the kth outcome will have an electoral moment m¯k.
h. Each permutation of the electoral marks is electorally allowed.
i. Each orientation of the electoral moments is electorally allowed.
j. The directional probabilities of orientation are uniformly distributed over all orientations.
k. The direction of the electoral moment m¯k is isotropic for k = 1, 2, . . . ,M .
3.1.1 Example Electoral System
An example of the model electoral system is illustrated in Figure 1. There the reader finds five
seats of power, each occupied with an elector whose single arrow points is aligned with one of
four distinct parties. The state of the example system is such that there is one elector aligned
with party 1, one elector aligned with party 2, two electors aligned with party three, and one
elector aligned with party 4.
3.2 Generating Function
Each and every permutation of a vote by an electorate is generated by the symbolic product of
N factors as (
p1 1ˆ+ p2 2ˆ+ . . .+ pM Mˆ
)N
. (1)
Each factor represents an elector that is directed in exactly one of some fixed finite number
M possible directions, 1ˆ, 2ˆ, . . .Mˆ , with probabilities p1, p2, . . . , pM . Consistent with electoral
reality, these probabilities are bounded as 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1 and constrained as
M∑
i=1
pi = 1. (2)
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Figure 1: Example electoral system. Here the electoral system is comprised of five (N = 5)
electors whose moments, mi, points in one of four (M = 4) directions. The state illustrated
here has two electors pointing in the direction of the Party 3, whereas there is one elector
pointing in the direction of the remaining parties; thus, the electoral vector of this state is N =
(1) 1ˆ + (1) 2ˆ + (2) 3ˆ + (1) 4ˆ. Though it may appear in this figure that 3ˆ = −1ˆ, in reality
these vectors exist in a multidimensional vector space. The interested reader may find more
information in Appendix A.
On multiplication, there are MN terms, one each for the MN permutations of the marks. The
set of directional unit vectors 1ˆ, 2ˆ, . . .Mˆ need not form an orthogonal set (see Appendix A).
3.3 Vector Definitions
Each state of the system has a correspondence with an electoral-excess vector, N , that describes
it as
N :=
M∑
k=1
Nk kˆ , (3)
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where Nk is the number of electors aligned with the kth party. Additionally, each system has an
equilibrium-electoral vector that is given as
No := N
M∑
k=1
pk kˆ . (4)
From these two, the author defines the electoral-excess vector as
x := N −N o =
M∑
k=1
(Nk − pkN) kˆ , (5)
The last vector to be defined is the one vector, 1¯. It is given as a linear combination of the
directions of all the outcomes as
1 :=
M∑
k=1
kˆ . (6)
The reader recalls that kˆ is the orientation of the kth party, and pk is the event probability of
outcome k.
3.4 Vote Configurations
Irrespective of each elector’s underlying preference, the result of a vote is always a parti-
tion [20, 21] of N into exactly M parts3. In Table 1, the author presents five complete set of
partitions; one each for five distinct electoral systems. In all cases, N = 5, and M = 1, 2, . . . 5,
respectively. The cardinality, c(N,M), of each set, C(N,M), is written on the last row of the
table.
3.5 Multiplicity Function
Multiplicity functions are central to this study. The multiplicity function, g
(
N
)
gives the num-
ber of occurrences of the electoral vector N . Within a constant of proportionality, the multi-
3The theory here can be exteneded to allow for abstention or non-participation. For example, allow that from the
N seats of power that NA electors abstain. Including for this eventuality, the system has one additional outcome.
Thus by taking into account absentions, a vote is always a partition of N into exactly M + 1 parts.
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Table 1: Example of partitions of N into M . Irrespective of each elector’s preferential marks,
the vote must tally to a partition of N intoM . The cardinality, c(N,M), of each set of partitions,
C(N,M), is given on the bottom-most row.
N = 5,M = 1 N = 5,M = 2 N = 5,M = 3 N = 5,M = 4 N = 5,M = 5
[5] [5, 0] [5, 0, 0] [5, 0, 0, 0] [5, 0, 0, 0, 0]
[4, 1] [4, 1, 0] [4, 1, 0, 0] [4, 1, 0, 0, 0]
[3, 2] [3, 2, 0] [3, 2, 0, 0] [3, 2, 0, 0, 0]
[3, 1, 1] [3, 1, 1, 0] [3, 1, 1, 0, 0]
[2, 2, 1] [2, 2, 1, 0] [2, 2, 1, 0, 0]
[2, 1, 1, 1] [2, 1, 1, 1, 0]
[1, 1, 1, 1, 1]
c(N,M) = 1 c(N,M) = 3 c(N,M) = 5 c(N,M) = 6 c(N,M) = 7
plicities are given by the probability-mass function of the multinomial distribution as
g
(
N
)
= MN N !
M∏
k=1
pNkk
Nk!
. (7)
Through graphic presentations of the multiplicity functions (see Figures 2 and 3), the reader
may respectively obtain a complete qualitative and quantitative understanding of how the sta-
bility and rigidity of electoral systems vary with respect to the quantity of electors and parties,
respectively.
In Table 2 the author includes relevant information regarding an electoral system with
N = 5, M = 3, p1 = 0.1, p2 = 0.3, and p3 = 0.6. In column 1, the author writes each
permutation of each of the c(N = 5,M = 3) partitions in the set C(N = 5,M = 3). The num-
ber of permutations of the vector N¯ is d
(
N¯
)
where
d
(
N¯
)
=
M !∏N
n=0m(n)!
. (8)
In the above equation, m(n) is the multiplicity of integer n – i.e., the number of instances of n
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in the multiset associated with vector N¯ . In column 2, the author writes the multiplicity, g
(
N
)
,
of each permutation. The sum of multiplicities, g
(
N
)
, correctly totals to MN .
Before continuing to the next section the reader will please note that each variable Nk (k =
1, 2 . . . ,M ; see Equation 3) possesses a binomial distribution. For example, with the aid of
Table 2 the reader can verify that the sum of all multiplicities, g
(
N
)
, for each tuple where
N1 = 1 is 79.7 (i.e., 1.0 + 15.7 + 7.9 + 31.5 + 23.6 = 79.7). This sum divided by MN is 0.33
(i.e., 79.7/35 = 0.33). This quotient is equal to the probability-density function of a binomially
distribution variable with event probability p1 = 0.1 that is evaluated at N1 = 1. Note that the
probability-density function, P , of a binomially distributed variable, Nk, evaluated at an integer
value n is
P (Nk = n) =
N !
n! (N − n)! p
n
k (1− pk)N−n , for n = 0, 1, . . . , N. (9)
Thus, the author utilizes the binomial distribution to qualitatively describe the stability and
rigidity of electoral systems (see the comments in Section 4.1 regarding Figures 2 and 3).
3.6 Ensemble Averages
A complete quantitative understanding of the stability and rigidity of electoral systems requires
the use of ensemble averages. In this paper, the author utilizes two distinct ensemble averages
of a function f : a magnitudal average, 〈f〉, and a directional average, {f}.
3.6.1 Directional Ensemble Average
The directional ensemble average is given as
{f} =
∫ 2pi
φM−1
∫ pi
φM−2
· · · ∫ pi
φ1
f dM−1S∫ 2pi
φM−1
∫ pi
φM−2
· · · ∫ pi
φ1
dM−1S
, (10)
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Table 2: Example: N = 5,M = 3, p1 = 0.1, p2 = 0.3, p3 = 0.6. To calculate the expected
value of a dynamic variable, each and every electoral state must be included (column 1). For
each state, the multiplicity (column 2) and the dynamic variable (column 3) are calculated From
these, a weighted sum is computed (column 4). Finally, the weighted sum is divided by the total
number of states. For an electoral system with five electors (N = 5) and three parties (M = 3),
the expected value of the systems variance is 656.1/ 243
N g
(
N
) {(
N −N o
)
·
(
N −N o
)}
g
(
N
) {(
N −N o
)
·
(
N −N o
)}
[5, 0, 0] 0.0 32 0.1
[0, 5, 0] 0.6 22 12.7
[0, 0, 5] 18.9 7 122.8
[4, 1, 0] 0.0 22 0.8
[4, 0, 1] 0.1 19 1.4
[1, 4, 0] 1.0 16 15.3
[1, 0, 4] 15.7 4 55.1
[0, 4, 1] 5.9 11 62.0
[0, 1, 4] 47.2 2 70.9
[3, 2, 0] 0.2 16 3.4
[3, 0, 2] 0.9 10 8.3
[2, 3, 0] 0.7 14 8.9
[2, 0, 3] 5.2 5 23.6
[0, 3, 2] 23.6 4 82.7
[0, 2, 3] 47.2 0 23.6
[3, 1, 1] 0.9 11 9.2
[1, 3, 1] 7.9 7 51.2
[1, 1, 3] 31.5 1 15.8
[2, 2, 1] 3.9 7 25.6
[2, 1, 2] 7.9 4 27.6
[1, 2, 2] 23.6 2 35.4
Sum 243 (35) 656.1
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where dM−1S is the differential surface area of an M-sphere and φ1, φ2, . . . , φM−1 are the angu-
lar coordinates of the M-dimensional4 electoral vector space (see Appendix A for more infor-
mation). As an example of use, in column 3 of Table 2 the author provides a directional ensem-
ble average for each permutation of each partition. Specifically, the author gives the directional
ensemble average of the dot product of the excess vector with itself, where the electoral-excess
vector is equal to the difference between the electoral vector and the equilibrium-electoral vec-
tor.
3.6.2 Magnitudal Ensemble Average
The magnitudal ensemble average is given as
〈
f
(
N
)〉
=
∑
N∈C˜(M,N)
f
(
N
)
g
(
N
)
∑
N∈C˜(M,N)
g
(
N
) . (11)
In the above equation, C˜(M,N) is the set of each and every permutations of each and every
partition of N into M parts (see Section 3.5). In column 4 of Table 2 the author provides
the product of the multiplicity and the directional ensemble average of the dot product of the
electoral-excess with itself. Thus, looking at the very last row of the table, the reader observes
that its magnitudal ensemble average is 656.1/243 = 2.7.
3.7 Fractional Fluctuation
The fractional fluctuation is a relative measurement of the expected deviation from equilibrium
of a system. The present author gives the fractional fluctuation as the square root of the expected
value of the inner product of the excess vector with itself, which is then normalized. It is
4Most generally speaking, there is one-dimension for each of the fixed integer M possible outcomes. In the
special case of party dynamics, the fact that two or more parties may agree on one issue does not lower the
dimensionality of the system in the broader context. De facto, each party has its own unique genesis and thus, in
broad terms, augments the dimensionality of an electoral system.
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mathematically defined in terms of the electoral vector, N , the equilibrium-electoral vector,
No, and the one vector, 1, as
F(N,M) :=
√〈{(
N −No
)
·
(
N −No
)}〉〈{
N · 1
}〉 . (12)
This form above is suggestive of the coefficient of variation (i.e., the square root of the variance
over the mean). Before continuing to explain how the fractional fluctuation is used to construct
the four dynamic variables of interest, the author notes that the literature is without consensus
on how to write the coefficient of variation for a multivariate distribution[22, 23].
3.8 Volatility, Flexibility, Stability, and Rigidity
The technical approach is to write the fractional fluctuation in a separable form as
F(N,M) = V(N)L(M) , (13)
where the volatility, V , is solely a function of quantity of electors and the the flexibility, L, is
a function of the quantity of parties (and their probability of representation [see Section 4.2]).
The fractional fluctuation is proportional to both the volatility an the flexibility of the system.
Meanwhile, the stability, S, and rigidity, R, of a system’s properties are defined as the unitary
complements of the volatility and fluidity, respectively, as
S(N) := 1− V(N), and (14)
R(M) := 1−L(M). (15)
Now that the technical approach is clarified, the author presents the results.
4 Results
In this section, the author presents two major results: the stability and the rigidity of the prop-
erties of electoral systems. The author presents a qualitative and quantitative explanation for
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both of these dynamic attributes. The author begins with a qualitative description that may be
gleaned through visual examination of the probability-density functions of the multinomially
distributed random variables (Section 4.1). The author ends with a quantitative description that
is given by closed-form analytic expressions (Section 4.2).
4.1 Qualitative Results
To illustrate the stability of electoral systems the author presents data for four distinct electoral
systems in Figure 2. In Panes (a), (b), (c), and (d), of Figure 2, the quantity of parties is fixed
at M = 3 and the the probabilities for each outcome are fixed at p1 = 0.1, p2 = 0.3, and
p3 = 0.6. That said, the quantity of electors are N = 1, N = 6, N = 15, and N = 200,
respectively. Similarly, to illustrate the rigidity of electoral systems the author presents data
for four distinct electoral systems in Figure 3. In Panes (a), (b), (c), and (d), of Figure 3 the
quantity of electors is fixed at N = 30 and the the probabilities for each and every outcome is
uniform (i.e., p1 = p2 = · · · = pM ). That said, the quantity of parties are M = 1, M = 2,
M = 30, and M = 500, respectively. The y axes of the eight plots are the probability-density
functions for each outcome. For efficacy of viewing, in each pane the author scales the results.
For example, in Pane (c) of Figure 2, each and every data point is multiplied by 2.91 before
they are plotted. The x axes of the four plots in Figure 2 are identical. On the x axis the author
present the quantity of electors aligned with each of the outcomes, Ni (see Equation 3),which
are all normalized by N . The x axes of the four plots in Figure 3 are identical. On the x
axis the author present the quantity of excess electors aligned with each of the outcomes, Ni
(see Equation 3),which are all normalized by N .
14
0 0.5 1
0
0.5
1
n/N , [1]
P
(N
k
=
n
)
[x
1.
11
]
 
 
N1; (p1 = 1/10)
N2; (p2 = 3/10)
N3; (p3 = 6/10)
(a) Number electors equals 1, number parties equals 3.
0 0.5 1
0
0.5
1
n/N , [1]
P
(N
k
=
n
)
[x
1.
88
]
 
 
N1; (p1 = 1/10)
N2; (p2 = 3/10)
N3; (p3 = 6/10)
(b) Number electors equals 6, number parties equals
3.
0 0.5 1
0
0.5
1
n/N , [1]
P
(N
k
=
n
)
[x
2.
91
]
 
 
N1; (p1 = 1/10)
N2; (p2 = 3/10)
N3; (p3 = 6/10)
(c) Number electors equals 15, number parties equals
3.
0 0.5 1
0
0.5
1
n/N , [1]
P
(N
k
=
n
)
[x
10
.6
3]
 
 
N1; (p1 = 1/10)
N2; (p2 = 3/10)
N3; (p3 = 6/10)
(d) Number electors equals 200, number parties
equals 3.
Figure 2: Stability. The probability-density functions are plotted as a function of the normalized
quantity of electors aligned with the kth outcome. Results in Panes (a), (b), (c), and (d) are
parameterized with respect to the quantity of electors. Vertical lines are the quantity of electors
at equilibrium.
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Figure 3: Rigidity. The probability-density functions are plotted as a function of the normalized
quantity of excess electors aligned with the kth outcome. Results in Panes (a), (b), (c), and
(d) are parameterized with respect to the quantity of possible outcomes. Vertical lines are the
electoral excess at equilibrium.
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4.1.1 Stability
Just as in the binary system[19], the stability of the system’s properties increases as the multi-
nomial distribution becomes more resolved and more steeply varying away from the peaks that
are located at equilibrium.
Resolution: In Figure 2, the reader notes, that in all cases N + 1 discrete points span the
domain of Ni/N . Therefore, the resolution (in the optical sense) is coarser for smaller N and
finer for larger N . When the quantity of electors is few, such as in Pane (a), there are no trends
or features to be readily observed. One may say that an electoral system with few electors are
unpredictable to the observer. Conversely, as the quantity of electors increases (c.f., Panes (a) to
(b) to (c) to (d)), the properties of the system are increasingly well resolved. One may say that
as quantity of electors increases the properties of electoral system are increasingly predictable
Sharpness: Once the number of electors exceeds some minimum threshold, the reader ob-
serves that each outcome’s distribution is uni-modal, with the mode of the ith outcome occur-
ring at the abscissa value Ni/N = pi . Furthermore, as the reader successively views Panes
(a), (b), (c), and (d), the variance of each distribution gets smaller and the probability density
sharply increases around the location of the equilibrium values (i.e., Ni/N = N pi/N = pi)
and otherwise approaches null. Ultimately, in the limit as the quantity of parties approaches
infinity the multiplicities approach delta functions centered around their respective equilibria
values. A larger variance indicates a system whose properties have greater volatility. A smaller
variance indicates a system whose properties have greater stability. Therefore, the properties of
the electoral system become increasingly stable because the system is increasingly likely to be
found closer and closer to equilibrium.
17
4.1.2 Rigidity
The author’s understanding of rigidity conforms to the normative usage5. Before continuing, the
reader is encouraged to bare in mind that the qualitative discussion herein applies specifically
to the maximum-entropy, special case where pk = 1/M for each of the k outcomes. A more
general and thorough description of the rigidity of electoral systems is offered analytically in
the quantitative results of Section 4.2.
M = 1; Absolute Rigidity: In exactly the same way that Wolin writes that political rigidity
is the absence of alternatives[25], the reader observes in Pane (a) of Figure 3 that there is one
and only one value of Nk with a non-zero probability density, namely the value at equilibrium
(i.e., Nk = 11 N). Similarly, in exactly the same sense as the mechanics of a rigid body, a one-
party system admits no fluctuations. Resulting from the fact that the electoral moments of each
and every elector are the same, the system admits no variation in response to an electoral force
– the change in momentum of each and every elector is identical under the application of an
electoral force.
M = 2; Two-Party System: The author plots the special case of an electoral system with
two parties in Pane (b) of Figure 3. For the case of M = 2, the probability distribution is
symmetric around the modal equilibrium value (Nk = 12 N). As opposed to the results in Pane
(a), there are now N + 1 integers in the domain of Pane (b) that yield a non-zero probability
density. In addition to the contribution towards the fractional fluctuation made by the value at
equilibrium (i.e., Nk = 12 N), there are now an additional N/2 unique alternative values of the
excess (i.e., ±1,±2, . . . ,±(N − 2)/2,±N/2) that make a contribution to the sum of squares
5Rigid 1 a : very firm rather than pliant in composition or structure : lacking or devoid of flexibility . . .
〈a rigid totalitarian system – Harrison Smith〉 . . . 6 : of, relating to, or constituting a branch of dynamics in
which the bodies whose motions are considered are treated as being absolutely invariable in shape and size under
the application of force[24].
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(see Equation 12).
M Finite; Multiparty System: For the sake of simplicity, in this paragraph the author con-
siders Nk to be a continuous real-valued random variable as opposed to a discrete random vari-
able (i.e., Nk ∈ R). The reader notes from the results given in Panes (b), (c), and (d) of Figure 3,
that as the quantity of parties increase from two towards infinity, that the probability distribution
is increasingly less symmetric around the modal equilibrium value located (Nk = 1M N). Thus,
the domain of absolute values of the excess (i.e., |n− pkN | ∈
[
0, M−1
M
N
]) increases; and as it
does there is a concomitant increase in the quantity of alternative contributions to the fractional
fluctuation (i.e., (n− pkN)2 ∈
[
0,
(
M−1
M
)2
N2
]
. Each of these additional alternatives presents
additional modalities with which to respond to an electoral force.
Limit as M Approaches Infinity: In Pane (d) of Figure 3, the author plots the probability-
density function of the random variable Nk for a very large quantity of outcomes M = 500.
The reader notes that in the limit as the quantity of outcomes approaches infinity, the probability
distribution increasingly appears as a reflected copy of the probability-density function for the
one-party system in Pane (a) of Figure 3. Indeed, as M approaches infinity, pk goes towards
1/M and the variance of the binomially distributed variable goes as O[〈(Nk − pkN)2〉] =
O [N 1
M
(
1− 1
M
)]
= N
M
. Thus just like in Pane (a), as M approaches infinity the variance of
the random variable Nk yields zero variability. However, as opposed to a one-party system there
are now M such binomially distributed random variables in the system. Consequently the total
variance of the multinomially distributed electoral system asymptotically approaches N (i.e.,
M N
M
= N) as opposed to null.
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4.2 Quantitative Results
The author begins this section by presenting the closed-form expression for the fractional fluc-
tuation. The interested reader may find a detailed proof of the expression in Appendix A. It is
then obvious to write analytic forms for the dynamic attributes of interest (Section 4.2.1). The
author ends this section by offering extremal values for the fractional fluctuation, flexibility and
rigidity, all of which depend on the probability of representation of each and every possible
outcome. This portion of the manuscript enables the reader to fully comprehend why the author
chose to highlight the probability-density functions for the special case of pk = 1/M (see Fig-
ure 3 and its associated discussion in Section 4.1.2). The interested reader may find a detailed
proof of the extremal values of these attributes in Appendix B.
4.2.1 Volatility, Flexibility, Stability, and Rigidity
In Appendix A the author derives the following expression for the fractional fluctuation.
F(N,M) =
[
1√
N
] 
√√√√1− M∑
i=1
p2i

. (16)
Comparing the result above with the separable form of the fractional fluctuation that is given in
Equation 13, the volatility, V(N), and flexibility, L(M), of the electoral system are respectively
revealed by the following closed-form analytic expressions:
V(N) = 1√
N
, and (17)
L(M) =
√√√√1− M∑
i=1
p2i . (18)
Next, comparing the results above with the definitions in Equations 14 and 15, the stability,
S(N), and rigidity, R(M), of the electoral system are respectively revealed by the following
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closed-form analytic expressions:
S(N) = 1− 1√
N
, and (19)
R(M) = 1−
√√√√1− M∑
i=1
p2i . (20)
As explained in the technical approach (see Section3.8), the volatility and stability of the sys-
tem’s properties are solely dependent on the quantity of electors while flexibility and rigidity of
the system’s properties are dependent on the quantity of parties (and each party’s probability of
representation).
4.2.2 Extremal Values
Beginning with absolute instability (i.e., S(1) = 0) for a single-elector system, the stability
increases monotonically to unity in the limit as the quantity of electors approaches infinity (i.e.,
limM→∞ S(M) = 1).
In Appendix B, the author shows that for a fixed integer M of possible outcomes the flexi-
bility is bounded as
0 ≤ L(M) ≤
√
M − 1
M
. (21)
The flexibility has a maximum when each of the M of possible outcomes is equally probable,
and has a minimum when any one of the possible outcomes is one-hundred percent probable.
The rigidity is thus bounded as
1−
√
M − 1
M
≤ R(M) ≤ 1. (22)
The rigidity has a maximum when any one of the possible outcomes is one-hundred percent
probable, and has a minimum when each of the M possible outcomes is equally probable. The
properties of an electoral system with one possible outcome are absolutely rigid. As the quantity
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of possible outcomes increases and the respective probabilities of each outcome are increasingly
proporional, then the properties of the electoral system become less rigid and more flexible.
5 Discussion
Until now the author offers mathematical notions of electoral dynamics. As a counterpoint, the
author now discusses how this theory is relevant to realpolitik. The author asks and answers
the following question: how does the theory of electoral stability and rigidity enhance our
understanding of the constituional order of the United States of America, which has multiple
branches of government? An individual analysis of each of three branches of government is
presented in Section 5.1. A comparitive analysis of three branches of government is presented
in Section 5.2. A tabular summary is given in Table 3.
Table 3: Realpolitik. Summary of the individual analyses of the governmental branches of the
United States of America. The brackets indicate a range of values.
Governmental Branch Stability Rigidity
President / Vice-President [0.00, 0.29] [0.00, 1.00]
Supreme Court [0.59, 0.67] [0.00, 1.00]
Senate [0.86, 0.90] [0.01, 1.00]
House of Representatives [0.93, 0.95] [0.00, 1.00]
5.1 Individual Analysis
An individual analysis of the executive branch, the judicial branch, and the legislative branch is
given in Sections 5.1.1, 5.1.2, and 5.1.3, respectively. The stability and rigidity of each branch
is sequentially described. Each attribute is bounded from below and bounded from above.
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5.1.1 Executive Branch
The executive branch of government is comprised of the federal offices of the President and
the Vice President. If the executive branch only included the president, then the executive
branch would be a single-elector system and thus absolutely unstable (i.e., S(1) = 0). Because
the founding fathers incorporated a line of succession6 that includes the federal office of the
Vice President, the executive branch is stabilized – at least to some extent. In consideration
of these facts, the author states that the stability of the executive branch, SE , is bounded as
S(1) ≤ SE ≤ S(2).
When deliberating any choice, the President may seek extensive council and demand mul-
tiple options from advisors and administrators. Ultimately the buck passing stops with the
President who is solely responsible to reduce the quantity of choices and select an outcome.
Each choice made by the President is circumstantial. At any time, there may be a myriad of
choices under deliberation. In consideration of these facts, the author states that the rigidity of
the executive branch, RE , is bounded as R(∞) ≤ RE ≤ R(1).
5.1.2 Judicial Branch
The judicial branch of government is comprised of the federal offices of the Justices of the
Supreme Court. Every decision is made by a majority vote; however, justices may recuse them-
selves from participation in any official action. That said, six members of the court constitute a
quorum. In consideration of these facts, the author states that the stability of the judicial branch,
SJ , is bounded as S(6) ≤ SJ ≤ S(9). In theory, lady justice is blind and so non-partisan. The
justices, in their robes may be considered either indistinguishable from each other or disitin-
guishable (i.e., independent judicial review). Subsequently, there are often unanimous decision
and there are also often more than one dissenting opinion. In consideration of these facts, the
6U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 1, Clause 5.
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author states that the rigidity of the judical branch, RJ , is bounded as R(9) ≤ RJ ≤ R(1).
5.1.3 Legislative Branch
The legislative branch of government is bicameral; it is composed of the Senate and the House
of Representatives. The quantity of electors in these branches are 101 and 430, respectively.
Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution requires that a quorum to conduct official Senate business
is the smallest integer larger than half the quantity of electors (i.e. 51). Whereas given by
the clerk of the House of Representatives, “when there are no vacancies in the membership,
a quorum is 218.7.” In consideration of these facts, the author states that the stability of the
Senate, SS , and the House of Representatives, SR, are bounded as S(51) ≤ SS ≤ S(101) and
S(218) ≤ SR ≤ S(430), respectively.
With respect to rigidity, while party cohesion is certainly factored into their choices, each
member of congress is also tied to the parochial interests of their local constituency, as well
as the political patronage from within and without their respective constituency. Therefore, as
in the judical branch, the author states that the rigidity of each camera is bounded from below
by their respecive quantity of members (i.e., R(M = N)); and is bounded from above by the
possibility of the electors acting in unison with consensus (i.e., R(M = 1)). In consideration
of the above, author states that the rigidity of the Senate, RS , and the House of Representatives,
RR, are bounded as R(101) ≤ RS ≤ R(1) and R(430) ≤ RR ≤ R(1), respectively.
5.2 Comparative Analysis
The summary of individual analyses of each branch of government is given in Table 3. The data
is consistent with the experience of the everyday lay political observer and the astute specialist.
The author finds that resulting from the inherent instability of the executive branch it is no won-
der that the election of the President/Vice President is the most watched and the most contested
7http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/legfaq.aspx
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of all. Further, one recognizes what the founders tacitly understood; specifically that a suc-
cession plan acts to stabilize the executive branch in case of a national tragedy or an untimely
death. The second most fevered pitch in the political calendar of the United States occurs when
the nation undergoes a Supreme-Court confirmation. It is precisely because of the relatively low
stability of a nine-seat jury opining on issues fundamently relevent to 300 million people that
the justices be thoroughly vetted and even subject to a super-majority vote. To first-order ap-
proximation, among the bicameral legislative branches, the observer notes that the Senate, with
its lesser quantity of electors and concomitant greater instability, is the more valued legislative
prize for the parties that comprise the political order; and that the House of Representative, with
its greater quantity of electors and greater stability, provides the highest fidelity representation
of the people.
6 Conclusions
Given that the number of electors is at most 8 billion () we may not safely presume that the
most probably configuration is the only configuration is the only significant configuration for
electoral systems.
This manuscript is inspired by the Supreme Court’s majority opinion on Timmons versus
the Twin-Cities Area New Party. The author draws on techniques well known in statistical
mechanics to refute the majority opinion of the court. In conclusion, (i) electoral stability and
electoral rigidity are best served by increasing the quantity of electors, (ii) electoral rigidity is
best served by decreasing the quantity of parties and reducing their proportional representation,
and (iii) the less stable a branch of government, the more concern is placed on those who would
hold those offices for the people.
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A Proof of Equation 16: The Fractional Fluctuation
The averaged expected value of the inner product of the electoral-excess vector with itself for
an isotropic moment is expanded as given as
A.1 Dual Ensemble Average
The fractional fluctuation is given as the dual-ensmeble average of the dot product of the
electoral-excess vector with itself (compare Equation 5 and Equation 12). This dot product
may be expansed as
x · x =
[
M∑
k=1
(
xk kˆ
)]
·
[
M∑
l=1
(
xl lˆ
)]
(23)
=
M∑
k=1
M∑
l=1
(
xk kˆ
)
·
(
xl lˆ
)
(24)
=
M∑
k=1
M∑
l=1
(xk xl)
(
kˆ · lˆ
)
(25)
=
M∑
k=1
x2k +
M∑
k=1
M∑
l=1
(xk xl)
(
kˆ · lˆ
)
(1− δk,l) (26)
. (27)
The Kronecker delta function, δk,l, is equal to zero when k 6= l and is one otherwise; xk =
Nk − pkN .
Next we consider the two distinct averages (see Equation 10 and Equation 11). A magnitu-
dal average, 〈x · x〉, which averages xk xl over each and every of the MN allowed states of the
system; and a directional average, {x · x}, which averages kˆ · lˆ over each and every allowable
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angles subtended between them. The derivation of the former is rather straitforward and de-
pends on known properties of the multinomial distribution. The derivation of the latter is rather
more involved; and so while the result is given below, the interested reader may view the entire
derivation in Section A.2. The author finds that
〈x · x〉 =
M∑
k=1
〈
x2k
〉
+
M∑
k=1
M∑
l=1
〈xk xl〉
(
kˆ · lˆ
)
(28)
=
M∑
k=1
N pk (1− pk)−
M∑
k=1
M∑
l=1
N pk pl
(
kˆ · lˆ
)
(29)
=N
[
1−
M∑
k=1
p2k −
M∑
k=1
M∑
l=1
pk pl
(
kˆ · lˆ
)]
. (30)
{x · x} =
M∑
k=1
x2k +
M∑
k=1
M∑
l=1
(xk xl)
{
kˆ · lˆ
}
(1− δk,l) (31)
=
M∑
k=1
x2k . (32)
With the use of Equation 43, the author writes the dual ensemble average as
{〈x · x〉} = 〈{x · x}〉 = N
[
1−
M∑
k=1
p2k
]
. (33)
A similar and straitforward derivation may be used to write the dot product of the excess vector
with the one vector. The result being that
{〈
x · 1〉} = 〈{x · 1}〉 = N . (34)
From the above two equations, one obtain that which was to be demonstrated, namely the
analytic form of the fractional fluctuation that is written in Equation 16.
A.2 Directional Ensemble Average of Dot Product of Two Vectors
In this section, the author allows that vectors uˆ1, uˆ2, . . . , uˆM form the basis of a M-dimensional
electoral vector space. Let kˆ be a radial unit vector. Allow that kˆ is isotropic and point in each
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and any direction on an M-sphere8 with equal probability. The probability-density function for
picking a vector kˆ with coordinates (φ1, . . . , φM−1) is
p (φ1, . . . , φM−1) =
∫ 2pi
φM−1
∫ pi
φM−1
· · ·
∫ pi
φ1
dM−1S , (35)
where dM−1S is the volume element of an (M − 1)-sphere or alternatively the surface element
of an M-sphere. The surface element is written as
dM−1S = sinM−2 (φ1) sin
M−3 (φ2) · · · sin (φM−2) dφ1 dφ2 · · · dφM−1. (36)
The solution to the integral in Equation 35 is well known as is given in terms of the gamma
function, Γ, as
p (φ1, . . . , φM−1) =
2 pi(M+1)/2
Γ
(
M
2
+ 1
) (37)
Next, let kˆ and lˆ be two radial unit vectors. Let kˆ be fixed. Without loss of generality let
kˆ = uˆ1. (38)
In spherical coordinates, kˆ corresponds to the unit vector with r = 1, φ1 = 0. Note that
φ2, . . . , φM−1 are arbitrary. For the special case where lˆ = kˆ, the expected value
{
kˆ · lˆ
}
is
given trivially as {
kˆ · lˆ
}∣∣∣
kˆ=lˆ
=
∫ 2pi
φM−1
∫ pi
φM−1
· · · ∫ pi
φ1
1 dM−1S
2pi(M+1)/2
Γ(M2 +1)
= 1 (39)
Next, let lˆ be isotropic and point in each and any direction with equal probability. Generally, in
Cartesian coordinates
lˆ = cos (φ1) uˆ1 + sin (φ1) cos (φ2) uˆ2 + . . .+ sin (φ1) sin (φ2) . . . sin (φM−2) sin (φM−1) uˆM .
(40)
8Typically, this is called an N -sphere. To conform with the present nomenclature, here it is called an M -sphere.
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In spherical coordinates, lˆ corresponds to the unit vector with r = 1, and φ1, . . . φM−1 are all
arbitrary. So, in light of Equations 38 and 40, the dot product kˆ · lˆ = cos (φ1). The expected
value
{
kˆ · lˆ
}
is given as
{
kˆ · lˆ
}∣∣∣
lˆ isotropic
=
∫ 2pi
φM−1
∫ pi
φM−1
· · · ∫ pi
φ1
cos (φ1) d
M−1S
2pi(M+1)/2
Γ(M2 +1)
. (41)
Next, comparing Equations 36 and 41; and bearing in mind that∫ pi
φ1=0
cos (φ1) sin
M−2 (φ1) dφ1 = 0 (42)
one obtains {
kˆ · lˆ
}∣∣∣
lˆ isotropic
= 0 (43)
B Proof of Equation 21: The Bounds of Flexibility
From Equation20, the flexibility is.
L(p1, . . . , pM) =
√√√√1− M∑
i=1
p2i . (44)
The extremal values of L occurs at the endpoint(s) and/or when the gradient of L, ∇L, is equal
to zero. Here, the author compares the values of the flexibility at the end point and the zero-
gradient point and determines the minimum and maximum values of the flexibility.
The end point(s) occurs when pj = 1 and pk = 0 for all k ∈ 1, . . . ,M and k 6= j . The
value of the flexibility at the endpoint(s), L|e.p., is
L|e.p. =
√
1− 1 = 0. (45)
Meanwhile, the gradient is generally given[26] by
∇L =
M∑
k=1
(
∂L
∂pk
kˆ
)
. (46)
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Plugging in from Equation 59, the gradient is
∇L =
M−1∑
k=1
(pM − pk) kˆ[
1−∑Mi=1 p2i ]1/2 . (47)
Thus for an arbitrary set of unit vectors, the gradient has a value of zero when pM = pk for all
k ∈ 1, . . . ,M . Further, considering the constraint given in Equation 2, the gradient has a value
of zero when pk = 1/M for all k ∈ 1, . . . ,M . So the value of the flexibility when the gradient
is zero, L|z.g.p., is
L|z.g.p. =
√√√√1− M∑
i=1
(
1
M
)2
=
√
M − 1
M
. (48)
The author finds that which was to be demonstrated. Namely, the flexibility has a maximum
when each of the fixed integer M of possible outcomes is equally probable and the flexibility
has a minimum when any one of the possible outcomes is one-hundred percent probable.
B.1 Constrained Rates of Change
In the present of the constrain given in Equation 2, we are allowed to talk about the partial
derivatives of L only if L is expressed as a function of independent variables. Without loss
of generality, the author chooses the variables p1, . . . , pM−1 to be the independent varbiables,
and view L and pM as functions of the independent variables before talking about the partial
derivatives. The notation (
∂L
∂pk
)
p1,...,pM−1
(49)
means that we are viewing L as a function of the independent variables p1, . . . , pM−1, and mea-
suring the rate of change ofL as pk (k ∈ 1, . . . ,M−1) varies while holding p1, . . . , pk−1, pk+1, . . . , pM−1
constant.
To compute
(
∂L
∂p1
)
p1,...,pM−1
, we need to express the differential flexibility, dL, in the form
dL =
M−1∑
k=1
[
dpk
(
∂L
∂pk
)
p1,...,pM−1
]
. (50)
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Yet L is intially a function of the variables p1, . . . , pM . If L =
√
1−∑Mp=1 p2i is viewed as
a function of RM , the definition of dL gives
dL =
M∑
k=1
 −pk[
1−∑Mi=1 p2i ]1/2 dpk
. (51)
If L is restricted to a function on the domain defined by the constraint given in Equation 2, then
Equation 51 still holds. Taking the differential of the constraint eqauation 1 =
∑M
k=1 pk gives a
relation between p1, . . . , pM , which is
0 =
M∑
k=1
dpk. (52)
Because we want dL in terms of the dp1, . . ., dpM−1 only, we solve Equation 52 for dpM ,
dpM = −
M−1∑
j=1
dpj (53)
and substitute into Eqation 51, which yields that
dL =
M∑
k=1
[
dpk
(
∂L
∂pk
)
p1,...,pM−1
]
(54)
=
M∑
k=1
dpk
−pk[
1−∑Mi=1 p2i ]1/2 (55)
= dpM
−pM[
1−∑Mi=1 p2i ]1/2 +
M−1∑
k=1
dpk
−pk[
1−∑Mi=1 p2i ]1/2 (56)
= −
M−1∑
k=1
dpk
−pM[
1−∑Mi=1 p2i ]1/2 +
M−1∑
k=1
dpk
−pk[
1−∑Mi=1 p2i ]1/2 (57)
=
M−1∑
k=1
dpk
pM − pk[
1−∑Mi=1 p2i ]1/2 . (58)
This means that (
∂L
∂pk
)
p1,...,pM−1
=
pM − pk[
1−∑Mi=1 p2i ]1/2 . (59)
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So the value of
(
∂L
∂pk
)
p1,...,pM−1
evaluates to zero when pM − pk.
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